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ABSTRACT  
   
Envy may be an emotion shaped by evolution to resolve large resource 
disparities in zero-sum ancestral environments. Previous research has found 
evidence for two types of envy: benign envy, which drives greater effort and self-
improvement; and malicious envy, which drives hostility toward the better-off 
target. We predicted that perceived resource scarcity would stoke either type, 
moderated by individual differences. Specifically, we predicted that high self-
esteem would steer people toward benign envy and self-improvement, whereas 
narcissism would spark malicious envy. After completing the Rosenberg self-
esteem scale and the Narcissism Personality Inventory (NPI-16), participants were 
randomly assigned to either read an article detailing severe cuts to university 
financial aid budgets (scarcity) or an article summarizing various forms of 
financial aid (control). Each article ended with the same envy-inducing paragraph 
about a particularly affluent scholarship-winner, after which participants 
completed a measure of both envy types, capturing feelings, appraisals, and 
behavioral tendencies. Results show that self-esteem predicts less malicious envy, 
while narcissism and scarcity predict more. Self-esteem and narcissism interact 
such that self-esteem dampens the effect of narcissism on malicious envy. Self-
esteem predicted benign envy when narcissism was low, but not when it was high. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Envy has been defined as an unpleasant emotional reaction to another’s 
superior achievement, resources, or qualities (Smith & Kim, 2007). At its core, 
envy rests on an unfavorable, upward social comparison (van de Ven, Zeelenberg, 
& Pieters, 2009). It appears to be a culturally universal capacity (Schoeck, 1969), 
and seems to occupy a familiar role in everyday discourse. While some research 
has explored the characteristics of envy, little is known about the factors that drive 
it. The present research investigates two factors that may influence the experience 
of envy – scarcity and self-esteem. 
 The present theoretical account of envy rests on three core features. First, 
the social comparison between Person A (envious person) and Person B (target) 
must be unfavorable to Person A. That is, Person A must have less than Person B 
in the relevant domain. Second, the domain or object must be relevant to Person 
A. That is, they must desire or value it, or otherwise care about the gap between 
themselves and Person B. A man who has no wish to become a musician is 
unlikely to envy a piano grand master’s skill. Consistent with this feature, Parrott 
& Smith (1993) found that longing, or desiring what the target has, is 
characteristic of envy. Finally, envy is an unpleasant or painful emotional state. 
More specifically, envy often includes feelings of inferiority, resentment, and 
hostility (Smith & Kim, 2007). A positive reaction to another’s greater 
achievement in some domain does not count as envy. Such a response would most 
likely count as admiration. Admiration lacks not only the negative sting of envy, 
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but van de Ven, Zeelenberg, and Pieters (2009) also find that admiration is less 
likely to involve a self-relevant domain and an explicit social comparison.  
Envy is sometimes paired with jealousy in theoretical taxonomies of emotion 
(e.g., Lazarus, 1991). These two emotions are distinct, however, in that jealousy is 
rooted in the threat of losing someone to another, whereas envy is rooted in an 
unfavorable social comparison. Parrott & Smith (1993) report that jealousy is 
distinctively characterized by distrust, righteous anger over betrayal, and 
uncertainty. They find that envy is more characterized by feelings of ill will and 
inferiority, perhaps accompanied a sense of guilt over the ill will.
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Chapter 2 
THEORIZED ADAPTIVE FUNCTION OF ENVY 
A functional approach to emotions research views many emotions as 
evolved mechanisms that served to enhance fitness in the environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness (EEA; for a thorough treatment, see Tooby & 
Cosmides, 2000). By this account, emotions are part of a computational 
architecture that weighs situational variables and motivates appropriate behavioral 
responses – “appropriate” in the sense that such responses were statistically more 
likely to yield fitness-enhancing outcomes in the EEA for a given trait. Discrete 
emotions (e.g. anger, fear, anticipatory enthusiasm) are viewed as superordinate 
programs that coordinate responses to specific types of problems or situations. For 
example, Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides’ (2009) recalibrational theory of anger posits 
that anger is a superordinate program designed to regulate conflicts of interest 
between individuals by inflicting costs or withholding benefits. These twin 
strategies are meant to cause the target of the anger to place more weight on the 
angry individual’s welfare. 
 We posit that envy may solve two related problems: a personal deficit of 
resources, and unfair or unequal resource distribution within the group. At the 
intrapersonal level, the realization that another person has more resources than 
oneself is an important signal, indicating that it is possible to have more resources 
or skills than one currently possesses. Envy should then facilitate resource 
acquisition by promoting the strategies or effort necessary to achieve the desired 
resource level. An emotional mechanism that motivates greater resourcefulness 
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and effort in the face of relative poverty is clearly adaptive. At the interpersonal 
level, group living in ancestral environments required cooperation in many 
domains: hunting, gathering, perhaps even child rearing. An unequal distribution 
of cooperatively secured resources – such as the kill from a hunt – would signal a 
violation of group fairness norms. Such violations could jeopardize future 
cooperative relationships. An envy mechanism would serve to counteract such 
unequal distributions, by sparking action against those persons with unfairly 
secured excess resources. Over the long term, such a regulatory mechanism would 
serve to discourage cheating and might lead to greater group cohesion, thus 
enhancing the chance of survival of group members. 
 This functional account has implications for the prototypical eliciting 
situations that should facilitate envy, as well as the action tendencies that should 
follow. The ancestral environment was a world of scarce resources (Minc, 1986), 
where survival pressures were fiercely salient. At an individual level, we expect 
that scarcity will make resource inequity more salient – one should be more aware 
of one’s own resource level, as well as that of others, in a resource-scarce 
environment. Thus, envy should be more common in conditions of scarcity. 
Indeed, there is evidence that malice toward those with surplus resources was 
common in times of scarcity and poverty (Colson, 1979). A key feature of this 
account of envy is that it involves two possible action tendencies: self-
improvement and/or malice toward the target of envy. Both strategies are geared 
toward equalizing resource distribution, but via different mechanisms.  
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 Moreover, we expect that perceived scarcity will tend to stoke perceptions of 
unfairness in response to inequity. Since there are fewer resources to go around, 
one’s attribution of self-responsibility for an unfavorable inequity should 
diminish. Put another way, one would have to hold oneself to an even higher 
standard than normal to place one’s own limitations as the cause of the inequity. 
Thus, it is more likely that perceived scarcity would, at least initially, drive 
perceptions of unfairness, rather than self-assessment and self-improvement. 
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Chapter 3 
MALICIOUS VS. BENIGN ENVY 
The two motivational profiles outlined above hint at two different 
subtypes of envy. Indeed, there is support for such a distinction. Drawing on the 
presence in the Dutch vocabulary of two distinct words for envy, van de Ven, 
Zeelenberg, and Pieters (2009) distinguished the features of malicious and benign 
envy. Based on cluster analyses of participants’ open-ended recalled experiences 
of envy as such, their findings suggest that both subtypes of envy rest on an 
explicit social comparison (unlike admiration or resentment). Where they differ, 
however, is that malicious envy is uniquely characterized by an assessment of 
injustice/unfairness and by low perceived control, whereas benign envy is 
characterized by assessments of fairness and higher perceived control (Smith et 
al., 1994; van de Ven et al., 2009).  This is consistent with Heider’s (1958) 
account of improving the self or “failing” the other. 
Perceptions of fairness in the context of resource allocation are well-
anchored in our species, and in fact predate us. Notably, Brosnan and de Waal 
(2003) find that capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees (Brosnan, 2006) reject 
unequal rewards in laboratory experiments. If a monkey witnesses another 
monkey receiving a better payment (grapes vs. cucumber) for the same effort, it is 
more likely to refuse to cooperate in subsequent trials than a monkey who 
received an equal payment. Moreover, such participants are more likely to refuse 
the unequal rewards – that is, they are willing to forfeit the food payment 
altogether, even though they readily consume this food in all other circumstances. 
  7 
Consistent with this analysis, other researchers have also found that perceived 
unfairness predicts feelings of envy accompanied by hostility (Cohen-Charash & 
Mueller, 2007; van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009). 
When presented with the fact of another’s greater resources, the fairness of 
the arrangement has logical implications for an adaptive response. If the inequity 
is perceived as unfair, one’s own strategies, qualities, and identity are not at issue. 
Redoubling one’s efforts would not change the unfairness of the inequity, which 
might be entirely out of one’s control. In this case, hostile or aggressive actions 
toward the target may be more effective than self-improvement at balancing 
resources. In studies across three Western countries, van de Ven et al (2009) 
found that benign envy was associated with a “moving up” motivation, aimed at 
self-improvement, and malicious envy with a “pulling down” motivation, aimed 
at lowering the target’s position. Those experiencing benign envy were more 
likely to want to be near the other and to try harder to achieve their goals, whereas 
those experiencing malicious envy were more likely to want to harm or degrade 
the other. 
 Although benign envy is clearly a more prosocial response to resource 
inequity than malicious envy, van de Ven et al (2009) find that benign envy is still 
a negative emotion, as participants reported feeling unpleasant and frustrated 
whether they experienced benign or malicious envy. 
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Chapter 4 
SELF-ESTEEM 
Although perceptions of scarcity and unequal resource distribution are 
predicted to increase envy generally, and perceptions of fairness and control are 
expected to influence the path to malicious or benign envy, trait-level individual 
differences may also play a role in the experience of these emotions. We predict 
that self-esteem will influence one’s propensity toward envy as such, as well as 
the type of envy experienced. Importantly, our account draws heavily from 
heterogeneous conceptions of self-esteem. 
Kernis’ (2003) innovative conceptualization of distinguishes between 
secure vs. fragile of self-esteem. This account frames self-esteem along four 
dimensions. Secure self-esteem is genuine – one’s publicly expressed positive 
self-regard is congruent with privately held feelings toward oneself. It is stable – 
one’s self-esteem does not fluctuate wildly from day to day. It is congruent – 
explicit (conscious) self-esteem is consistent with implicit (non-conscious) 
indicators. Finally, and most important for our purposes, secure self-esteem is 
noncontingent – it does not depend on certain outcomes or favorable social 
comparisons. 
 Persons with fragile self-esteem are preoccupied with their achievements 
and how those achievements stack up to the expectations of others and oneself 
(Deci & Ryan, 1995). Unfavorable social comparisons are especially threatening 
to those with fragile self-esteem (Wood, et al., 1994). Paradise and Kernis (1999) 
found that women with highly contingent self-esteem were more angry in 
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response to an insulting evaluation. Additionally, they were more likely to want to 
retaliate against and hurt the insulter. There is also evidence that negative 
feedback is more broadly threatening to the self when self-esteem is fragile. 
Schneider and Turkat (1975) found that people high in defensive self-esteem 
responded to negative feedback by enhancing their self-presentation beyond the 
scope of the feedback. 
 Fragile self-esteem has much in common with narcissism, which is 
characterized by grandiosity and entitlement (Brown, Budzek, & Tamborski,  
2009), and aggressive reactions to criticism and unfavorable social comparisons 
(Horton & Sedikides, 2009). Negative feedback is more threatening to the self-
worth of narcissistic individuals (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). This contingent 
nature of feelings of self-worth is consistent with the aforementioned findings on 
fragile self-esteem. Moreover, narcissism has several components, including 
Leadership/Authority, Superiority/Arrogance, Self-Absorption/Self-Admiration, 
and Exploitation/Entitlement. Rhodewalt and Morf (1995) report that the latter 
two in particular correlate with hostility. This is informative in light of the fact 
that narcissism positively correlates with self-esteem (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). 
Indeed, Rhodewalt and Morf report that the Exploitation/Entitlement component 
of narcissism does not correlate with self-esteem as measured by the Janis-Field 
feelings of inadequacy scale. This implies that feelings of entitlement are not 
characteristic of high self-esteem. 
The pervasive Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) does not 
differentiate between secure vs. fragile self-esteem, or between self-esteem and 
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narcissism. Given the lack of a comprehensive self-report measure of secure vs. 
fragile self-esteem, measures of narcissism may prove fruitful as proxy measures 
of fragile self-esteem. By measuring both self-esteem and narcissism, interactions 
between the two constructs may expose the differential effects of secure vs. 
fragile self-esteem. In particular, high self-esteem combined with low narcissism 
should cohere with secure self-esteem. Similarly, high self-esteem in conjunction 
with high narcissism coheres with fragile self-esteem. 
Since malicious envy is characterized by hostility toward the target, those 
with fragile self-esteem should be more prone to malicious envy than those with 
secure self-esteem. The fragility of narcissism should also find the reality of a 
better-off or more successful other to be more threatening to the self. As noted 
earlier, malicious envy is also characterized by appraisals of unfairness and low 
perceived control. The latter is theoretically similar to Ryff’s (1989) 
environmental mastery. Ryff found that those high in self-esteem were high in 
environmental mastery. Using Ryff’s (1989) measure of psychological well-
being, Paradise and Kernis (2002) found that high stable self-esteem individuals 
were higher in environmental mastery and autonomy than those with unstable – 
but still high – self-esteem. Therefore, when individuals with secure self-esteem 
do experience envy, they may retain a greater sense of control or efficacy. If so, 
they should tend to experience benign, rather than malicious, envy. 
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Chapter 5 
THE PRESENT STUDY 
The present study investigated scarcity, self-esteem, and narcissism as 
interacting predictors of malicious and benign envy. Participants completed 
measures global self-esteem and narcissism, then read a news article that included 
either a scarcity prime or control passage, and an envy induction. Finally, 
participants completed a self-report envy measure, tapping into both malicious 
and benign envy. 
 Hypothesis 1: Scarcity will increase both benign and malicious envy. 
Hypothesis 2: Self-esteem will dampen the effect of scarcity on malicious 
envy. 
 Hypothesis 3: Self-esteem will predict lower malicious envy overall, but 
this effect will vary depending on levels of narcissism. 
3a: Self-esteem will predict less malicious envy most strongly 
when narcissism is low, and least strongly when narcissism is high. 
 Hypothesis 4: Self-esteem will predict greater benign envy, but this effect 
will vary depending on levels of narcissism: 
4a: Self-esteem will predict greater benign envy most strongly 
when narcissism is low, and least strongly when narcissism is high. 
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Chapter 6 
METHODS 
Participants 
 234 participants were recruited from the Arizona State University 
undergraduate psychology participant pool. 36 participants who failed both of the 
items in a basic recall quiz about the induction article were excluded from 
analyses, reducing N to 198 (142 females, 56 males. Mean age was 19.0 (SD = 
2.19), and approximately 73% of participants were White / Caucasian. 
Design 
 This study employs a between-subjects design (Prime: scarcity vs. 
control), with two continuous individual difference predictors (self-esteem and 
narcissism). 
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited for an online study titled “Personal 
Experiences and Relating to Others.” In one online session, participants 
completed a basic demographic questionnaire, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, 
the Narcissism Personality Inventory (NPI-16), and several other self-report 
measures. After completing these measures, participants were randomly assigned 
to read one of two purported ASU State Press news articles: “Please read 
carefully through the following article. It’s a draft State Press article that has not 
yet been published. After you’ve read it, we’ll ask you about your reaction to the 
issues presented.” 
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In the Scarcity condition, participants read an article detailing severe cuts 
to financial aid budgets at ASU. In the control condition, participants read an 
article summarizing various forms of financial aid (e.g. merit vs. need-based), 
making no mention of budget cuts. Both articles ended with the same passage 
about a particularly affluent scholarship winner. The following passage (gender-
matched to the participant) served as our envy induction: 
 
Jennifer (John) Stone, a freshman Microbiology major, came in 
with a National Merit Scholarship. A Chandler native, Jennifer feels lucky 
to have won a scholarship based on her academic performance in high 
school. Her parents own several restaurants, and could have easily 
covered her college costs. By winning the scholarship for tuition and dorm 
fees, however, Jennifer is able to reap other benefits: “I saved my parents 
a lot of money by getting the scholarship. Because of that, I was able to do 
a summer science program in France, which cost over $10,000 with 
expenses.” Jennifer also noted that she doesn’t need to worry about 
working to be able to make ends meet and afford extras.  
 
Immediately after reading the news article, participants completed a 37-
item envy questionnaire (labeled as article feedback) spread across three screens 
assessing feelings, appraisals, and action tendencies respectively. Finally, 
participants completed a two-item manipulation check, asking whether ASU 
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enrollment levels should be increased/decreased, and their opinion of how present 
ASU funding levels compare to other universities.  
 
Measures 
Envy Self-Report Measure (Appendix A). This 37-item scale is designed 
to capture malicious and benign envy, along with universal features of envy as 
such. It captures feelings (16 items), appraisals (13 items), and action tendencies 
(8 items). The action tendencies were broken into benign and malicious subscales 
(4 items each), and are the focus of our analyses. Sample items include “I wish 
something bad would happen to her” (malicious), and “I’m going to win a 
scholarship of my own” (benign). Participants are asked to rate each item 
according to whether it reflects their current state/appraisal, using a 5-point scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). The malicious action tendencies 
subscale demonstrated acceptable reliability, Cronbach α = .74, and the benign 
action tendencies subscale fared similarly, Cronbach α = .72. Feelings of envy 
correlated with malicious envy action tendencies, r = .16, p < .05 and benign envy 
action tendencies, r = .15, p < .05. Similarly, core envy appraisals correlated with 
malicious envy action tendencies, r = .18, p < .01 and benign action tendencies, r 
= .18, p < .05. 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). This 10-item scale is a 
well-established and validated measure of global self-esteem (Blascovich & 
Tomaka, 1991). Participants are asked to respond according to how they feel 
about themselves most of the time. Our version employs a 5-point Likert-type 
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scale, ranging from 0 (Disagree Strongly) to 4 (Agree Strongly). Scores are 
computed as the mean of all item scores (after accounting for reverse-coded 
items). It demonstrated high reliability in this sample, Cronbach α = .89. 
Narcissism Personality Inventory – 16 (Ames, Rose, & Anderson, 2005). This is a 
compact measure of narcissism, employing 16 paired-choice items. Sample pair: 
“I find it easy to manipulate people” (narcissistic) and “I don’t like it when I find 
myself manipulating people” (non-narcissistic). Narcissistic responses were coded 
as 2, and non-narcissistic responses were coded as 1. Scores are computed as the 
mean of all item codes. It demonstrates fair reliability in this sample at α = .71. 
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Chapter 7 
RESULTS 
This sample reported mean self-esteem scores of 2.86 (SD = .79) on a 0-4 
scale, and mean narcissism scores of 1.38 (SD = .21) on a 1-2 scale, with “2” 
indicating selection of the narcissistic option. The mean score for malicious envy 
action tendencies was 1.23 (SD = .53), and 3.04 (SD = .91) for benign envy 
action tendencies, both using the same 1-5 scale. (Correlations between all these 
variables are reported in Table 1.) Notably, malicious envy is not normally 
distributed, with a skewness of 2.96 (SE = .17) and a kurtosis of 9.61 (SE = .64 ). 
Scores on this variable are positively skewed – of the 199 responses collected, 
144 participants reported no malicious action tendencies. That is, they answered 1 
– Not at all, in response to each of the four items. The remaining 55 participants 
endorsed at least some degree of malicious envy. There were no main effects of 
participant sex on either of the dependent variables reported below, nor any 
interactions between participant sex and target sex. 
 
Table 1 
Pearson correlation matrix of key variables (N = 187) 
 Narcissism Malicious Envy Benign Envy 
Self-esteem .343*** -.214** .139* 
Narcissism  .215** .001 
Malicious Envy   .068 
* p = .053.    ** p < .01.   p < .001. 
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Malicious Envy Action Tendencies 
A simultaneous regression analysis was performed, including scarcity, 
self-esteem, and narcissism as predictors of malicious envy. The scarcity 
manipulation increased malicious envy, as hypothesized, β = .17, t(181) = 2.45, p 
< .05. Self-esteem predicted lower malicious envy, β = -.32, t(181) = -4.38, p < 
.01, while narcissism, predicted greater malicious envy β = .31, t(181) = 4.28, p < 
.01, both as predicted (overall R2 = .17). Next, all possible interaction terms were 
added to the model. The only significant interaction is the self-esteem X 
narcissism interaction, β = -.17, t(177) = -1.99, p < .05, R2 = .24 . All three main 
effects remain significant in the full model (see Table 2 for full regression 
results). Treating narcissism as the moderator, simple slopes of the relationship 
between self-esteem and malicious envy were calculated at three levels of 
narcissism: mean – 1 SD; mean; mean + 1 SD. The slopes are -.04 (ns), -.16 (p < 
.05), and -.27 (p < .05), respectively (Figure 1). Examination of the slopes reveals 
that self-esteem exerts a downward influence on levels of malicious envy when 
narcissism is high, countering the main effect of narcissism. At mean levels of 
narcissism, we see the same effect of self-esteem, albeit less steep. Finally, at low 
levels of narcissism, malicious envy is already near its floor, and thus there is 
little room for self-esteem to have a downward effect. 
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Table 2 
Summary of multiple regression results for malicious envy action tendencies (N = 
185) 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 β t β t 
Scarcity .167* 2.445 .170* 2.421 
Self-Esteem -.316*** -4.376 -.228* -2.027 
Narcissism .313*** 4.282 .223* 2.312 
Scarcity X Self-Esteem   -.140 -1.313 
Scarcity X Narcissism   .158 1.701 
Self-Esteem X 
Narcissism 
  -.174* -1.990 
Scarcity X Self-Esteem 
X Narcissism 
  -.078 -.908 
R2 .171 .243 
* p < .05.     ** p < .01.   *** p < .001. 
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Figure 1. Simple slopes for self-esteem x narcissism interaction on malicious envy. 
 
 The extreme positive skew of malicious envy action tendencies calls into 
question whether linear regression is an appropriate model for this data. Residuals 
for the model were not normally distributed, violating an assumption of linear 
regression. A dichotomous logistic regression was performed to validate the 
accuracy of the linear regression coefficients. (Logistic regression does not 
assume normality or homoscedasticity of the residuals.) In this case, the malicious 
envy DV was dichotomized as follows: reporting no malicious envy action 
tendencies = 0, reporting any degree of malicious envy action tendencies = 1. This 
dichotomization is not arbitrary in the manner of a median split. Rather, it maps to 
a theoretically meaningful and data-driven distinction between the majority of 
participants who reported no malicious envy at all, and those who endorsed at 
least some degree of it. Dichotomization results in a loss of power, but logistic 
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regression protects against loss of power slightly better than least squares 
regression on a dichotomized outcome variable (Taylor, West, & Aiken, 2006). 
Logistic regression computes the probability of the outcome “1” – here the 
probability of reporting any malicious envy. Odds ratios, the key statistic of 
interest, indicate the odds of reporting malicious envy at a given value of the 
predictor, over the odds of reporting malicious envy at a value of the predictor 
one unit lower. Odds ratios > 1 indicate greater odds of experiencing malicious 
envy at the higher value of the predictor compared to the lower value. The logistic 
regression analysis yields the same main effects as the linear regression: Scarcity 
predicts a higher probability of malicious envy (odds ratio, 2.29), as does 
narcissism (odds ratio, 19.20). Self-esteem predicts a lower probability of 
reporting malicious envy (odds ratio, 0.47). There is not a significant self-esteem 
x narcissism interaction in the logistic regression (see Table 3 for full results). 
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Table 3 
Summary of logistic regression results for malicious envy action tendencies (N = 
185) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Β SE 
Odds ratio 
(Exp(B)) 
B SE Odds Ratio 
(Exp(B)) 
Scarcity .830 .355 2.294* .791 .358 2.205* 
Self-Esteem -.754 .246 .470** -.739 .249 .478** 
Narcissism 2.955 .952 19.197** 2.96 .960 19.302** 
Self-Esteem X 
Narcissism 
   -1.783 1.189 .168 
* p < .05.     ** p < .01.  
 
 
 
Benign Envy Action Tendencies 
 A simultaneous regression analysis was performed, regressing benign 
envy action tendencies on all predictors and interaction terms. There were no 
main effects of scarcity, self-esteem, or narcissism. However, there is a significant 
self-esteem X narcissism interaction, β = -.10, t(179) = -3.48, p < .01. Treating 
narcissism as the moderator, simple slopes of the effect of self-esteem on benign 
envy were calculated at three levels of narcissism: mean – 1 SD; mean; mean + 1 
SD. The slopes are .37 (p < .01), 0 (ns), and -.37 (p = .07), respectively (Figure 2). 
Examination of the slopes reveals that self-esteem drives benign envy action 
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tendencies upward, but only when narcissism is low. Conversely, when 
narcissism is high, self-esteem drives benign envy downward. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Simple slopes for self-esteem x narcissism interaction on benign envy. 
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Summary of multiple regression results for benign envy action tendencies (N = 
179) 
 β t 
Scarcity -.021 -.715 
Self-Esteem .000 -.011 
Narcissism -.022 -.748 
Scarcity X Self-Esteem .026 .816 
Scarcity X Narcissism .002 .066 
Self-Esteem X Narcissism -.097** -3.482 
Scarcity X Self-Esteem X Narcissism .084** 3.170 
** p < .01.              R2 = .09 
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Chapter 8 
DISCUSSION 
The goal of the present study was to expose some of the situational and 
dispositional factors that drove malicious vs. benign envy. We hypothesized that 
scarcity would drive both types of envy upward. In this study, it only increased 
malicious envy, with no effect on benign. In concrete terms, looming cuts to 
financial aid budgets did not increase participants’ motivation to obtain their own 
scholarship or work harder to achieve their goals. This result may expose one of 
the limitations of the envy induction used in this study. Once students are already 
enrolled in a university, scholarships may no longer be much of a concern, since 
such aid is usually arranged at the time of admission. Moreover, cuts to aid 
budgets make the task of securing a scholarship much harder. These two facts in 
combination may explain the failure of this scarcity induction to drive benign 
envy. The effect of scarcity on demand for a good or service (Cialdini, 2009) 
doesn’t operate here because the good may not be in much demand to begin with, 
and there is no implicit descriptive norm indicating demand – budgets were cut, 
rather than supplies being exhausted by demand. The scarcity induction did 
increase malicious envy, which is not constrained by the difficulty of obtaining a 
scholarship in a budget-slashed environment. Malicious envy, or hostility toward 
the affluent student, is essentially free relative to benign envy. 
We also hypothesized that self-esteem would predict less malicious envy, 
and it did. We attribute this to the greater self-confidence captured in self-esteem. 
Self-esteem did not, however, interact with scarcity. This was our dampening 
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hypothesis – that self-esteem would dampen the effect of scarcity on malicious 
envy. Since most participants did not report any malicious envy, such an 
interaction is more difficult to expose. Future studies may have more success on 
this front by using more focused measures of secure self-esteem. 
We hypothesized a self-esteem x narcissism interaction. However, the 
nature of the interaction was surprising. We hypothesized that self-esteem would 
have its strongest effect on malicious envy when narcissism was low, and a 
weaker effect when narcissism was high. Instead, we found the opposite pattern – 
self-esteem had its strongest effect when narcissism was high. Interestingly, this 
finding does not undercut our theoretical framework. Rather, it emerges out of the 
fact that when narcissism is low, malicious envy is already at its floor (approx. 1.1 
on a 1-5 scale). There is no significant downward movement possible, and thus no 
room for self-esteem to have an effect. As a partial proxy for fragile self-esteem, 
narcissism proved to be a more decisive predictor than we expected, at least when 
self-esteem was low.  Self-esteem had its strongest effect when narcissism was 
high. That is, self-esteem dampened the influence of narcissism on malicious 
envy, exerting a more dominant influence than we expected. Examination of 
scatter plots reveals that this effect was not driven just by people high in both 
narcissism and self-esteem. Rather, we find that there are some participants who 
score low on self-esteem and high on narcissism. This combination was not 
featured in our hypotheses, and it may rest on a self-view that features the 
Exploitative/Entitled aspect of narcissism combined with low ratings of self-
worth. 
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The highest levels of malicious envy occur when self-esteem is low and 
narcissism high. Even then, malicious envy scores are not high in absolute terms 
(approx. 1.6 on a 1-5 scale).  The malicious envy items were quite strong, with “I 
wish I could hurt her somehow” and “I wish something bad would happen to her”. 
It appears that most participants were uncomfortable endorsing such strong 
malice, even to a slight degree. The bottom-heavy distribution of malicious envy 
makes interpretation of the observed effects somewhat tentative. Benign envy, on 
the other hand, showed much broader distribution. The interaction between self-
esteem and narcissism results from a significant upward effect of self-esteem on 
benign envy when narcissism is low. This high self-esteem, low-narcissism 
combination represents secure self-esteem in our framework. As predicted, secure 
self-esteem yields greater achievement motivation, rather than hostility toward the 
envy target. 
The results are intriguing given that self-esteem and narcissism are 
positively correlated with each other, yet move malicious envy in opposite 
directions. While both measures tap into positive or praiseworthy self-
assessments, narcissism represents more of a comparative self-view. For example, 
the narcissistic choices from the paired choice items include “I am more capable 
than other people” and “I am an extraordinary person”. This is a more 
unequivocal perspective than the “at least on an equal plane with others” phrasing 
from the Rosenberg inventory. Thus, a story about an extraordinarily affluent and 
academically successful student may create more tension for a narcissistic 
individual – it strains the perception of oneself as more capable or worthy than 
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others. It makes sense that a narcissistic individual would be motivated to see the 
situation as unfair, and to target the other rather than redouble one’s efforts. 
Future research should focus on obtaining more variance in malicious 
envy measures, perhaps by drawing from recalled personal experiences of envy 
rather than elicitors based on a remote stranger. Also, future research may benefit 
from experimentally manipulating the appraisal dimensions theorized to drive 
malicious envy: perceived fairness and self-confidence. Such manipulations will 
help clarify the interplay between trait self-esteem factors and situational 
mediators of the envy experience. 
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 APPENDIX A  
ENVY SELF-REPORT MEASURE  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Feelings 
 
Think back to Jennifer, the scholarship winner in the article. The following words 
describe different feelings you might have. Please rate how you feel when you think 
about Jennifer and her situation. 
 
1                 2                    3                 4                     5 
Not at all                Somewhat            Extremely 
 
1) Frustrated.  
2) Ashamed.   
3) Nervous.  
4) Enthusiastic.  
5) Angry.  
6) Sad.  
7) Motivated.  
8) Happy. 
9) Confident.  
10) Inspired.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The following items also relate to your thoughts and feelings regarding Jennifer. Please 
think about the extent to which each statement is true for you, and answer according to 
the following scale, choosing a number from 0 to 6: 
 
      1                2                3                4                5 
Not at all          Moderately          Absolutely 
 
Appraisals 
 
1) I wish I had as much as she has.     
2) She has more than I have.  
3) It matters to me that I have less than her.   
4) She got what she has fairly.  
5) I’m confident that someday I can have as much as she has.   
6) I’m confident that I’ll be able to achieve what I want in life.  
7) It’s unfair that she has what she has.   
8) I’ll never be able to live the way she does.  
9) Some people get so much more than they deserve.   
10) She deserves to lose some of her aid.  
11) I admire her.   
12) She seems very driven.  
13) Her achievement is impressive.  
 
Action tendencies 
1) I’m going to try harder to achieve my goals.  
2) I’m going to win a scholarship of my own.  
3) I would like to be her friend.  
4) I feel like putting more effort into school. 
5) I wish something bad would happen to her.  
6) I wish I could hurt her somehow.  
7) I wish I could bring her down to my level.   
8) I wish I could take away her scholarship. 
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